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1. Introduction 
According to the efficient market hypothesis asset prices should fully reflect the 
available information set. The timely incorporation of information into market prices, the so-
called process of “price discovery”, can be facilitated if agents recognise a certain trading 
venue as a polar market where informative prices are provided to market participants. Instead, 
when the same financial instrument is traded in different venues, trades are fragmented and 
price discovery is split among markets. Despite trade fragmentation, competition across 
trading platforms can be beneficial since it can drive down the cost of capital for market 
participants by lowering costs and risks for investors. The balance between benefits and costs 
arising from a multi-platform environment cannot be established ex-ante: it is mainly an 
empirical question. 
The issue of how trade fragmentation affects price discovery and in which market price 
leadeship occurs, that is where more timely and informative prices are provided, is extremely 
relevant not only for investors’ pricing and hedging purposes but also for the supervisory 
activity of public authorities. In the empirical literature on multi-market price discovery, two 
popular measures are the Component Shares (Harris et al., 1995), CS, and the Information 
Shares (Hasbrouck, 1995), IS. While these approaches have been applied to stocks (Huang, 
2002), credit derivatives (Blanco et al., 2005), foreign exchange (Tse et al., 2006) and 
commodity (Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo, 2010) markets, there is scant empirical evidence 
(and generally focused on the relationship between spot and future prices) for the government 
fixed income securities market (Upper and Werner, 2002; Brandt et al., 2007; Chung et al., 
2007). Understanding how information is incorporated into prices in the case of this specific 
financial segment is even more crucial since it also has policy implications for public debt 
management. An efficient secondary Treasury bond market is indeed the most important 
channel for the domestic funding of budget deficits and increases the effectiveness of 
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monetary policy as well as the degree of overall financial stability. 
This paper aims at quantifying the degree of price discovery in the MTS (Mercato 
Telematico dei Titoli di Stato) system, the main electronic platform for euro-denominated 
government bonds, where parallel quoting for benchmark bonds can take place on a 
centralised European trading venue (EuroMTS) competing with a number of (relatively large) 
domestic markets. As in Caporale and Girardi (2011), we focus on these two cash markets for 
euro-denominated government securities. However, whilst that study tested if the duplicated 
market setting of the MTS system allows some degree of information disclosure even in the 
“satellite market” (Hasbrouck, 1995), here we examine how trade fragmentation affects the 
degree of price discovery across competitive trading venues. 
As the speed at which information arrivals are processed by market participants in a 
certain trading venue can be influenced by market-specific characteristics as well as by 
institutional arrangements (Huang, 2002), a proper modelling approach to assessing the role 
of trade fragmentation in the process of price discovery must be able to discriminate between 
these two possible types of driving factors. The duplicated market setting of the MTS system 
is well-suited for this purpose owing to the similarity of market-making obligations across 
trading venues and the possibility for market-makers to post for the same bond parallel quotes 
in the domestic and the European platforms. These features enable us to focus on market 
characteristics alone, and in particular on how trading concentration impacts on price 
leadership. 
Our analysis brings together different, though connected, strands of research. It is 
naturally related to the expanding literature investigating how the secondary market for euro-
denominated securities functions. Previous studies have focused on the dynamic relationship 
between trading activity and price movements (Cheung et al., 2005) or between yield 
dynamics and order flow (Menkveld et al., 2004), on the determination of the benchmark 
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status among securities of similar maturity (Dunne et al., 2007), on the analysis of yield 
differentials between sovereign bonds (Beber et al., 2009), and on whether endogenously 
determined liquidity and trading activity conditions are driven by common factors for the 
European market as a whole (Caporale et al., 2012). 
Our paper is also related to other empirical studies (Yan and Zivot, 2007; Bui and 
Sercu, 2009; Kim, 2010) emphasising the intrinsic dynamic nature of the process of price 
discovery. Even though widely used and easy to compute, both CS and IS only measure the 
contemporaneous response of asset prices to the arrival of new information. Further 
limitations arise from non-uniqueness (for the IS) and possibly non-boundedness (for the CS) 
problems. Yan and Zivot (2007) suggest instead a framework, based on the accumulation of 
impulse responses to shocks to the efficient price, which takes into account the dynamics of 
the process of price formation. Our proposed metric, the Loss Shares, LS, falls into the 
category of dynamic price discovery measures and represents a modification of the metric by 
Yan and Zivot (2007) which makes them bounded in the [0,1] interval. 
Price discovery and trading activity (and more generally, liquidity conditions) are 
intimately related (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Chakravarty et al., 2004). Their interaction is 
very important for regulators, as market infrastructures may be improved in order to 
encourage competition among dealers and across trading platforms. Further policy relevance 
comes from the Directive 2004/39/EC disciplining the functioning of Markets in Financial 
Instruments in Europe (MiFID), which has generated a heated debate among academics and 
practitioners on whether and how to extend the MiFID regime to the Treasury bond market. 
Consequently, our analysis should be of interest to supervisory authorities and debt managers 
dealing with multi-platform environments for trading government securities. 
The contribution of the present study is twofold. First, it develops new price discovery 
measures; second, it applies them to investigate whether there exist optimal thresholds in the 
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trade-off between trade concentration and information efficiency for incorporating 
information into prices in a multi-market environment in the case of euro-denominated 
government securities, an investigation not carried out before. Analysing daily transaction 
price data for 107 European Treasury bonds over a period of twenty-seven months, and 
applying our measures, we find a greater role for the trading of government securities on the 
domestic platforms in the disclosure of information about their (unobservable) efficient price 
than traditional measures would indicate. Also, the polarisation between central and 
peripheral markets appears to be stronger when the dynamics are taken into account, and a 
market’s contribution to price discovery appears to be crucially affected by the level of 
trading activity. Moreover, moving from a polarised environment where a market dominates 
in terms of trades and price discovery to a situation where trades are equally split between two 
trading venues (perfect market segmentation) does not affect the dominant role of the polar 
market in terms of price leadership.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical framework used to 
construct the price discovery measures. Section 3 outlines the key institutional features of the 
MTS system and provides details of the dataset. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the estimation 
results. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The empirical framework 
Consider a security traded on platform ,i  1 2 . Let , ,( , )t t tp p p  1 2  denote a 2 1  vector 
of (log) prices observed in the two markets. We assume that the efficient price of the bond 
follows a random walk process shared by the two market prices. Since the prices in tp  have a 
common efficient price they should not drift far from each other and therefore should be 
cointegrated as follows: 
, ,t t tp p p  1 2  ( )I 0          (1) 
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Whether the two log-price series, albeit individually non-stationary, are linked to one 
another by a stationary long-run equilibrium condition can be tested in the context of a 
dynamic system for a pair ( 1,tp , 2,tp ). To do this, we start from the reduced-form Moving 
Average (RMA) model in its Wold representation form: 
( )t tp L e   , ( )
k
kk
L L


   0  , I 0 2       (2) 
where the matrix polynomial *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )L L L    1 1  is such that the elements of 
{ k } k

0  are 1-summable, [ ]tE e  0 , [ , ]t s eE e e    if s t  and [ , ]t sE e e  0  otherwise. 
If condition (1) holds, then tp  has a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model 
representation of infinite order (approximated by the VEC model of finite order k 1 ), which 
is the empirical reduced-form model:  
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where the vector   takes the form ( )1 1 , the vector   (with elements  1 0  and  2 0 ) 
contains the feedback coefficients which measure the average adjustment speed for each price 
to eliminate the price differential and the term   captures systematic differences in the two 
prices. 
2.1. Reduced-form price discovery measures 
Reduced-form price discovery measures focus on the long-run impact of the reduced-
form shocks on the levels of tp , which is given by ( ) ...I    2 1 21 , where ( ) 1  has 
rank one if condition (1) holds.  
Following Johansen (1991), the long-run impact matrix ( ) 1  can be decomposed as:  
( ) ( ( ) )             
11 1        (4) 
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where ( )
k
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1 ,   and   are 2 1 matrices such that    0  and    0 . 
Let also ( )   1 2  denote the common row of ( ) 1 . As shown in Hasbrouck (1995), since 
( )  1 0  and ( )  1 1 , the rows of ( ) 1  are identical. This is because the long-run 
impact of any innovation on the price of the same asset in multiple markets is expected to be 
identical.  
Hasbrouck (1995) measures price discovery in the i -th market as the contribution of 
market i  to the variance of the permanent shock (market i ’s Information Share, IS):  
([ ] )i
i
e
F
IS


 
2
 , ,i  1 2         (5) 
where F  is a lower triangular matrix such that eFF   . As shown in Ballie et al. (2002), for 
the bivariate case with ( )  1 1  we have    . Since price innovations are generally 
correlated across markets, the matrix e  is likely to be non-diagonal. In such a case, 
Hasbrouck’s approach can only provide upper and lower bounds on the information shares of 
each trading venue. 
Based on the Gonzalo and Granger (1995)’s permanent-transitory decomposition, the 
Component Share, CS, metric proposed by Harris et al. (1995) measures each market’s 
contribution to the common efficient price.
1
 In terms of   the CS can be written as: 
i
iCS




 
 , ,i  1 2          (6) 
                                                 
1
 Such a decomposition assumes that: 1) the permanent component is a linear combination of the series contained 
in vector tp ; 2) the transitory components do not Granger-cause the permanent one in the long run. Note that the 
latter is not necessarily a random walk, unless 1k   in (3) or in general when 0i   , 1,..., 1i k  . On the 
basis on the efficient markets hypothesis, Hasbrouck (1995) argues that this must be the case for a sensible 
interpretation. Possible violations of the random walk hypothesis may imply that the permanent component can 
be forecastable and the  ’s can be interpreted as portfolio weights. 
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where i  is the i -th element of   and   is a vector of 1’s. Also note that for the bivariate 
case with ( )  1 1  we have that   1 2  and   2 1 , so that iCS  can be computed 
directly from the reduced-form VEC model (4). iCS  lies in the interval [0,1] (provided that 
the elements in   are positive which ensures that both  ’s in (3) are correctly signed). Note 
finally that high (low) values of the statistics indicate a large (small) contribution of the i -th 
market to price discovery. 
2.2. Dynamic price discovery measures 
Building on a structural cointegration model with one permanent and one transitory 
shock, Yan and Zivot (2007) propose a dynamic price discovery measure calculated from the 
impulse response functions (IRFs) of a market’s price to the permanent innovation of 
common trend. Following Yan and Zivot (2007), we assume that , ,[ , ]t t tp p p    1 2  admits 
the following Structural Moving Average (SMA) representation: 
( )t tp D L    , ( )
k
kk
D L D L


 0  , D I0 2       (7) 
where the elements of { kD } k

0  are 1-summable and the matrix D0  defines the 
contemporaneous correlation structure of tp . Yan and Zivot (2007) identify the structural 
parameters in (7) derived from the RMA (2) formulation as:  
( ) ( )
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where ( ) ( )L L G  1 , t tGe  , [ ]tE   0  and [ , ]t sE      if s t  and [ , ]t sE    0  
otherwise, H  is a unique lower triangular matrix with 1’s along the principal diagonal such 
that HCH   , C  is a unique diagonal matrix with positive entries along the principal 
diagonal, ( ) ( )D L L H , with D G H 10 , t tH
  1 , where t  ( t ) contains the (un-) 
orthogonalised permanent and transitory disturbances. 
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In order to retrieve the elements of t , a three-step procedure is followed. First, the 
elements of the matrix G  are obtained by applying the procedure outlined in Gonzalo and Ng 
(2001), which makes it possible to define the (un-orthogonalised) permanent and transitory 
innovations from the reduced-form disturbances te ’s as [ ]
P T
t t t tGe      [  ¦ ] te  such 
that:  
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The second step consists in calibrating the long-run impacts of the (un-orthogonalised) 
permanent shock on the price variable such that they are the same. From condition (4) and if 
P
t te   , the long-run impact of a unit change in 
P
t  will be equal to  . As pointed out by 
Yan and Zivot (2007), a natural identification restriction is that a unit change in Pt  will have 
a unit impact on all price variables. This has two implications: first,   will be equal to a 2 1  
vector of 1’s; second,   will be the common row vector of the long-run matrix ( ) 1 . 
The third step concerns the rotation of the un-orthogonalised permanent and transitory 
disturbances to achieve uncorrelated shocks. Accordingly, the variance-covariance matrix for 
the elements in t ,  , is factored as HCH   , so that the variance-covariance matrix of 
the orthogonalised shocks, t tH
  1 , turns out to be diagonal: 
[ , ] ( ) ( , )t t P TE H H C diag
 

        1 1 2 2       (10) 
Under these conditions the long-run impact matrix for the SMA representation is: 
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so that conditions (9) translate into the following ones: 
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Conditions (13) are the basis to construct the price discovery measure IRFs, ,i mf , 
,i  1 2 : 
, ,
, ,
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f d
 
 
  
  
 
 
0 0
      (13) 
where ,
P
i ld  represents the coefficient on the l -th lag of ( )
P
id L . A numerical summary of ,i mf ’s 
is given by the price discovery efficiency loss for market i  at a given horizon m  in response 
to a unit permanent trend shock and is defined as the difference between ,i mf  and its 
asymptotic value ( )Pid 1 1: 
*
*
,( ) ( )
m
i i m
m
m f

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0
1         (14) 
where *m  is a truncation lag sufficiently large to ensure that *,i mf ≈1  and (.)  is a symmetric 
loss function, such as the absolute loss ( (.) | . | ) or the square loss ( (.) (.) 2 ). Yan and 
Zivot (2007) measure the degree to which the market is informative in terms of price 
discovery as:  
*
*
( )
ln
( )
i
i
j
m
YZ
m
 
  
  
 , ,i j  1 2  with i j       (15) 
where positive (unbounded) values indicate lower efficiency for market i , and viceversa. 
In order to obtain a bounded metric with a straightforward intepretation, we propose a 
new price discovery measure, the loss share, LS, based on condition (15), which is defined as 
the ratio of the efficiency loss in a market and the total absolute loss:  
* * *( ) / ( )i i jjLS m m  
2
1
 ,  ,i  1 2        
Note, however, that the interpretation of such a measure is the opposite with respect to 
reduced-form price discovery measures: higher values of *iLS  indicate a greater efficiency 
loss in market i  and thus a lower contribution to the price discovery process, and viceversa. A 
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direct comparison between the ratio of the efficiency loss and traditional price discovery 
measures can be made conveniently by expressing markets’ contribution to price discovery 
as: 
*
*
*
( )
( )
( )
j
i i
jj
m
LS LS
m


  

2
1
1  ,  ,i  1 2       (16) 
so that, according to our metric (always bounded between the [0,1] interval), the contribution 
to price discovery of a given market is directly related to the degree of information 
inefficiency observed in the remaining market(s). 
Table 1 summarises the main features of the different price discovery measures 
discussed above in terms of identification structure, boundedness properties and statistical 
inference methods. 
[Table 1] 
 
3. Exchanges and data 
Trading on the secondary Treasury market can occur via four channels: inter-dealer 
(B2B) platforms and dealer-to-customer (B2C) electronic trading platforms, either multi-
dealer or single-dealer, OTC inter-dealer via voice brokers and OTC dealer-to-customer 
trading. B2B platforms are essentially for the trading of Treasury bonds and generally operate 
via cross-matching methods. 
In the European case, MTS, Icap/BrokerTec Eurex Bonds and eSpeed are the main 
ones. In particular, the MTS system accounts for 40 percent of government bond transactions 
in Europe (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2003) and for around 72 percent of the volume of 
electronic trading of European cash government bonds (Persaud, 2006). Similar figures are 
provided by BearingPoint (2005), according to which around 75 percent of trades within the 
B2B segment takes place on the MTS platform.  
 [11] 
The MTS system is an example of quote-driven electronic order book markets for 
government securities. Proposals are firm, immediately executable and aggregated in a limit 
order book. Trades are anonymous and the identity of the counterpart is only revealed after an 
order is executed for clearing and settlement purposes.
2
 Market participants can be classified 
as either market makers (primary dealers) or market takers (dealers). Primary dealers have 
exclusive rights to participate in auctions and, at the same time, are obliged to quote prices for 
government securities issued in the secondary markets under specific terms (in general, 
maximum bid-ask spread and minimum quantity). In contrast, dealers cannot enter quotes into 
the system and are obliged to trade bonds on the basis of bid/ask quotes placed by the market 
makers. 
All government marketable securities issued by euro area Member States are listed on 
their respective domestic MTS platforms. Only benchmark securities (i.e. on-the-run bonds 
with an outstanding value of at least 5 billion euro that satisfy listing requirements such as the 
number of dealers acting as market makers) are admitted, instead, to trading on the European 
(EuroMTS) marketplace. Thus, for benchmark securities dealers are allowed to post their 
quotes on both markets simultaneously (parallel quoting). Despite their similar architecture, 
the domestic MTS and the EuroMTS markets differ in that the former aims at satisfying the 
issuer’s liquidity needs within a regulated setting whilst the latter is an inter-dealer market. 
Bond price transaction data are extracted from the MTS (Mercato Telematico dei Titoli 
di Stato) time series database, whose structure is discussed in Dufour and Skinner (2004). As 
in Caporale and Girardi (2011), daily observations cover the period from January 2, 2004 to 
March 31, 2006. This sample period corresponds to a relatively quiet period in financial 
markets since it ends a few weeks before the sudden appearance of severe liquidity problems 
                                                 
2
 Full anonymity has been recently reached through the introduction of the central counterparty (CCP) system, 
which aims at eliminating any risk faced by participants in trading with other dealers. 
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in several financial segments.
3
 Although there is plenty of evidence that cross-market price 
adjustments tend to occur at a higher frequency than a daily one, the use of daily observations 
for bond prices appears to be reasonable since government bonds are traded less frequently 
and in larger blocks than other financial assets (such as currency or stocks).
4
 Furthermore, 
Green and Joujon (2000) argue that daily resettlements create a strong argument for using 
daily closing prices, since they determine the cash flows of traders. 
For each trading day, the dataset reports a time stamp, the nominal value of trading 
volume, the average size of trades, the last transaction price recorded before the 17.30 Central 
European Time close, and the average best bid/ask spread throughout the trading day. We 
consider government bonds issued by all euro area Member States, except for Luxembourg.
5
 
For each country, we select all benchmark government bonds traded in January 2004 
maturing after the end of our estimation horizon. Table 2 reports the International Securities 
Identification Number (ISIN) code for the 107 selected bonds.  
[Table 2] 
 
4. Price discovery estimates 
The estimated values of LS with absolute and square loss functions in the domestic 
                                                 
3
 Mizrach (2008) finds that the ABX index, aggregator of the performance of a variety of credit default swaps on 
asset backed securities, exhibits significant jumps as early as mid-2006, well before any problem in the 
mortgage market were discussed in the press or policy circles. Moreover, using the same dataset as in Caporale 
and Girardi (2011) allows us to make a direct comparison with their findings. 
4
 Previous studies on intra-day price discovery (mainly focused on stock or currency markets) have used data at 
various frequency, ranging from a few minutes (see, among others, Booth et al., 2002; Huang, 2002; Kim, 
2010) to a few seconds (Hasbrouck, 1995; Yan and Zivot, 2007). 
5
 Namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. Luxembourg is not included in the analysis since there are no Luxembourgian bonds quoted in MTS 
markets in the sample period considered. 
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MTS markets are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
6
 In all cases, the truncation lag *m  
is set equal to 100. In each table, 95 percent confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap 
replications are reported in square brackets. 
The results are interesting in a number of respects. First, the absolute (square) LS 
implies that the estimated loss shares are lower than 0.5 in only three cases, suggesting that 
prices in the domestic MTS markets are the most informative for the purpose of price 
discovery.
7
 Second, the bootstrap confidence intervals show that the shares are statistically 
significant and higher than 0.5 in 83 cases (reported in bold), confirming that the domestic 
MTS markets are relatively more efficient trading environments. Third, the two LS measures 
are closely related to each other, with an estimated correlation coefficient equal to 0.90.  
[Table 3] 
[Table 4] 
Tables 5 to 8 report the contribution of each market to price discovery computed 
according to the IS and CS methods. Since the IS approach involves a Choleski factorisation 
of the covariance matrix of the innovations in prices on the two exchanges, a particular 
ordering of prices needs to be chosen. As the information shares are not unique, Table 5 and 
Table 6 report upper and lower bounds for each bond included in the analysis along with 95 
percent bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
                                                 
6
 The metrics introduced in Section 2 above require equally spaced data without missing values. Following 
Upper and Werner (2002), in the presence of missing observations we use the last available transaction price 
(the “fill-in” method). According to standard unit root and stationarity tests, the 214 individual transaction 
price series expressed in logarithms are integrated processes of order one. Moreover, the Horvath and Watson 
(1995) cointegration test for the null of no cointegration against the known alternative of rank one with 
(1 1)   strongly supports the existence of a (1 1)  cointegration vector in all 107 pairs ( 1,tp , 2,tp ). The 
complete results are not reported for reasons of space, but are available on request. 
7
 Namely, the bonds with code GR0133002155, IE0006857530 and IE0031256328. 
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[Table 5] 
[Table 6] 
As can be seen, while there are 102 statistically significant cases of upper bounds larger 
than 0.5 (Table 5), there are only 42 of them when the lower bounds are taken into account 
(Table 6). The gap between lower and upper bounds is therefore too wide to draw strong 
conclusions; however, one can safely state that the domestic MTS market dominates in term 
of price leadership for only 42 out of 107 bonds in the sample.
8
 Non-uniqueness represents a 
problem, since understanding the cross-sectional determinants of price discovery (discussed 
later on) requires a unique value instead of upper and lower bounds. A practical though not 
fully theoretically justifiable way to overcome such a problem is to compute the average of 
those bounds (see Ballie et al., 2002). The results in Table 7 give an overall picture quite 
similar to the one emerging in Table 3 and Table 4: there are only two cases with a 
contribution lower than 0.5 and the domestic MTS market shares turn out to be larger than 0.5 
in 87 cases.  
[Table 7] 
                                                 
8
 These very wide bounds are due to non-zero correlations in e . The contemporaneous correlation coefficient 
of the residuals of the estimated bivariate VEC models ranges from 0.05 to 0.86, with a mean value of 0.42. 
Furthermore, in 54 out of 107 models the correlation coefficient turns out to be statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. Shortening the interval of observation could help to reduce these correlations and obtain tighter 
bounds (Hasbrouck, 1995). However, a number of studies (Baillie et al., 2002; Huang, 2002; Eun and 
Sabherwal, 2003) have found a wide divergence between upper and lower bounds even when using prices 
sampled at a few minute intervals (a very high frequency for the case of euro-denominated government 
securities). Therefore, wide bounds are inevitable for our IS measure. A simple regression analysis of the 
difference between upper and lower IS bounds on the correlation coefficient reveals that error correlation enters 
positively and significantly and explains about 79 percent of the cross-sectional variation of the upper and lower 
IS spread.  
 [15] 
Concerning the results from the CS method (Table 8), the estimated   in 8 cases 
contain negative elements, which leads to difficulties in the interpretation of the CS 
(Hasbrouck, 2002). The domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery indeed turn 
out to be larger than unity. Focusing now on the remaining 99 meaningful estimates of price 
discovery, the CS method indicates for the domestic MTS markets a statistically significant 
share larger than 0.5 in 77 cases. 
[Table 8] 
Further evidence on price discovery in the MTS system is provided in Table 9 where we 
report summary statistics (upper panel) and correlation coefficients (lower panel)
 
for LS and 
the other metrics (namely, IS and CS).
9
 Based on the standard error of the means, all average 
values are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. According to the LS, the 
domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery ranges between 84 (for the absolute 
LS) and 93 percent (for the square LS). The evidence from the traditional price discovery 
measures is similar, even though the contribution of the domestic MTS markets to the 
discovery of the efficient price seems to be lower.
10
 The comparison of the median values of 
our price discovery measures with those from IS and CS further corroborates this conclusion. 
Our findings reveal that measures taking into accont only the contemporaneous response of 
asset prices to new fundamental information about asset values tend to underestimate the 
                                                 
9
 For the computation of summary statistics and correlations for IS we use the average bounds, whilst for CS we 
follow Blanco et al. (2005) and replace values larger than 1 with unity.  
10
 The small differences between the present results and those in Caporale and Girardi (2011) can be explained 
by the different information criterion chosen to estimate the VEC models. While in Caporale and Girardi 
(2011) the optimal lag of the bivariate VEC models was chosen according to the Akaike Information Criterion, 
the price discovery measures used in the present study are based on VEC models whose optimal lag structure 
is determined using the Schwarz Information Criterion.  
 [16] 
contribution of the leading market to price discovery.
11
 
The pair-wise correlations between the various metrics turn out to be positive, as 
expected. Although all co-movements are highly statistically significant, the pair correlations 
for structural price discovery are higher than those between structural and reduced form 
metrics. Finally, we observe a relatively lower degree of correlation for the square version of 
LS with respect to the its absolute counterpart, owing to its higher degree of non-linearity. 
[Table 9] 
 
5. Trading segmentation and markets’ contribution to price discovery 
It is widely recognised that market-specific characteristics, such as trading activity, 
prevailing bid/ask spreads and market volatility may influence the speed at which information 
arrivals are processed by market participants in a certain trading venue (Eun and Sabherwal, 
2003; Chakravarty et al., 2004, among others). 
A well-functioning market is indeed characterised not only by high trading volumes but 
also by low price volatility and tiny bid/ask spreads. More liquid markets, with a continuous 
trade flow, tend to record small price variations; in contrast, less liquid markets, with 
extensive non-trading intervals, are likely to exhibit a higher return volatility: this suggests an 
inverse link between (relative) standard deviations of price changes and the degree of 
contribution to price discovery. Likewise, it is reasonable to expect an inverse relationship 
between price discovery measures and bid/ask spreads, since these constitute the largest part 
of trading costs. 
In order to assess to what extent observable market characteristics influence the process 
                                                 
11
 It would be interesting in future work to compute the LS metrics with high-frequency data in order to test 
whether the dominant market’s contribution to the price discovery process is higher than implied by traditional 
price discovery measures.  
 [17] 
of price formation in the MTS system, we perform a cross-sectional regression of LS as a 
function of: a) the share of trading volumes ( trax ), defined as the ratio of the nominal trading 
volumes on the domestic MTS market to the aggregate nominal trades on both domestic MTS 
and EuroMTS markets (over the sample period); b) the relative volatility ( volx ), given by the 
difference (domestic MTS minus EuroMTS) between the absolute price changes (from 
equally-weighted daily averages over the sample period); c) the relative transaction costs 
( sprx ), obtained as the difference (domestic MTS minus EuroMTS) between the best bid/ask 
spreads throughout the day (from equally-weighted daily averages over the sample period).
12
 
Table 10 presents summary statistics of the observable market characteristics in our 
cross-sectional analysis. 
[Table 10] 
As Table 3 and 4 show, LS is constrained within the interval between 0 and 1. Because 
of the bounded nature of the dependent variable, we cannot implement an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression, ( | ) tra vol sprE LS x x x x x         0 1 2 3 , since the predicted 
values from the OLS regression cannot be guaranteed to lie in the unit interval.
13
 An 
alternative to the standard OLS specification is ( | ) ( )E LS x G x   where (.)G  satisfies 
( )G z 0 1, for all z  , ensuring that the predicted LS lies in [0,1] interval. The most 
common functional forms for (.)G  are the standard cumulative normal distribution (i.e. the 
probit model case) and the logistic function (i.e. the logit model case).
14
 Given the non-
                                                 
12
 Data for the explanatory variables used in the cross-section analysis are taken from the MTS database (Dufour 
and Skinner, 2004). 
13
 See, among others, Bastos (2010) for a similar application of fraction regression models. 
14
 Note that with the identity function the fraction regression model collapses to the standard OLS regression. 
The quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of   is consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the 
distribution of the LS conditional on the x ’s (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). 
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linearity of the functions ( )G x , the partial effects of the explanatory variables on LS are not 
constant, in contrast to the standard OLS case. Table 11 reports the estimated coefficients for 
each of the three different functional forms when the dependent variable is the absolute (Panel 
A) and the square loss (Panel B). 
[Table 11] 
In all regressions, the role of trade shares is highly significant. The positive signs of the 
estimated coefficients for trade shares indicate that relatively higher trading volumes lead to 
an increase in the relative contribution to price discovery. The opposite holds for volatility 
and transaction costs: LS metrics turn out to be inversely related to those two market 
characteristics, in a way consistent with standard market microstructure arguments and with 
the evidence from other financial segments, such as equity markets (Eun and Sabherwal, 
2003; Chakravarty et al., 2004). Note also that relative spreads have a minor role in 
explaining price discovery: trading cost differentials between the domestic MTS and 
EuroMTS appear not to be a major factor for choosing a trading platform rather than another, 
corroborating the conclusions of Cheung et al. (2005). Moreover, the square LS specification 
accounts for a higher percentage of the deviance than the absolute LS, with the logit and 
probit functional forms outperforming their OLS countepart (especially in the case of the 
square LS measure). Finally, in all specifications relative trading activity is by far the most 
relevant factor in explaining cross-section variability in price discovery measures, as the 
decomposition of the explained deviance shows.  
Because the regressions in Table 11 involve different functional forms, the meaning of 
the regression coefficients are not the same. By contrast, the regression functions, ( | )E LS x , 
have a direct probabilistic interpretation. Accordingly, we compute the response predictions 
( | )E LS x  from the estimated models in order to assess how the predicted LS are expected to 
vary when the share of trading volumes is assumed to change from its maximum 
 [19] 
(corresponding to the case of total trading dominance) to 0.5 (that is, the case of perfect trade 
segmentation).
15
 The results from this exercise are reported in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1] 
The upper graphs of Panel A and Panel B show the partial effects of changes in the 
trade share on the absolute and square LS, respectively. As expected, while the partial effects 
in the OLS case are constant, those from logit and probit specifications are non-linear 
(especially for the square LS case). Note also that the linear OLS framework produces 
unsatisfactory results for the square LS case, with negative predicted values when trade shares 
are assumed to take values greater than 0.85. The lower graphs in both panels are based on 
our preferred specification (the logit function), with the dotted bold line representing the 
partial effects, the dashed lines the 95 percent confidence intervals and the thin solid line the 
main diagonal. 
A type of optimal treshold emerges at the point where the diagonal crosses the partial 
effects line: when the partial effects are above the diagonal, there is a higher than one-to-one 
response of the contribution to price discovery to degree of trade concentration in the 
corresponding market; by constrast, when the partial effects lie below the diagonal, further 
concentration of trades translates into small gains in terms of price discovery. According to 
the evidence from the absolute LS, such a threshold corresponds to around 92 percent (with 
an estimated confidence interval of 89-95 percent) of trades occurring in the domestic MTS 
markets. This may explain why trades occurring in the EuroMTS have a non-negligible 
                                                 
15
 When computing partial effects of trade shares on LS, relative spreads and market volatility have been set 
equal to the sample averages. Similar results to those presented in Table 11 are obtained by regressing both LS 
metrics and traditional price discovery measures on the share of contracts (i.e. the ratio between the total 
number of contracts to the domestic MTS market and the aggregate number of contracts to both domestic MTS 
and EuroMTS markets, over the sample period) instead of the trade shares. The complete set of results is 
available on request. 
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informational content, even though this resembles a prototype of “satellite market” (in the 
sense of Hasbrouck, 1995), as previuosly documented in Caporale and Girardi (2011). In the 
case of the square LS, full concentration of trades in the dominant market removes 
inefficiency losses in that trading venue (suggesting perfect concentration and thus zero 
segmentation). 
To assess the impact of the main variables of interest (the trade shares) on the relative 
contribution of the dominant market, we focus on the logit specification for the absolute LS, 
in order to provide more conservative evidence. As the sample mean for the trade share is 
0.74 (see Table 10), the predicted value for the dependent variable is 0.84. By increasing trade 
shares to 0.80, the relative contribution to price discovery associated with the domestic MTS 
market increases to roughly 0.87, with an increase of around 3 percentage points. By contrast, 
an increase of the dependent variable from 0.95 to 1 (perfect market concentration) yields 
only marginal gains in terms of a reduction in the relative information inefficiency and thus a 
greater contribution to revealing the efficient price (which rises from 0.93 to 0.94). 
Since they are not affected either by non-uniqueness or by unboundedeness problems, 
as discussed in Section 4.2 above, the LS metrics are more appropriate for our purposes. For 
the sake of completeness, Figure 2 reports the same simulation exercise for the LS metrics 
when the two traditional price discovery measures are used as the response variable.
16
 The 
results strongly support the previous findings, although the evidence from traditional price 
discovery measures suggests a greater role for trades in the satellite market (with a treshold 
value ranging between 85 and 90 percent). This leads to overestimating the role of the satellite 
market and consequently underestimating the contribution of the polar market, suggesting that 
                                                 
16
 When considering traditional price discovery measures, the following should be taken into account: for IS, we 
use the average of upper and lower bounds; for CS we replace wrongly signed 2 ’s with zero in order to make 
the price discovery measure bounded in the [0,1] interval. 
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the benefit from a multi-platform environment might be overvalued if measured by traditional 
price discovery measures.  
[Figure 2] 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of trade segmentation in the process of price discovery 
in the market for euro-denominated government securities. We propose new metrics (the 
efficiency loss shares) to assess the degree of price discovery occurring in the MTS (Mercato 
Telematico dei Titoli di Stato) system, a duplicated market setting where parallel quoting for 
benchmark bonds can take place on a centralised European trading venue competing with a 
number of domestic markets.  
Analysing price data on daily transactions for 107 bonds over a period of twenty-seven 
months, we find a greater degree of price leadership of the dominant market when our 
measures (as opposed to the traditional price discovery metrics) are used. Our results suggest 
that neglecting the dynamic nature of the process may lead to understimating the price 
leadeship of the dominant market. We also present unambiguous evidence that the level of 
trading activity crucially affects a market’s contribution to price discovery. The proposed 
econometric approach is of more general interest, since it does not include any variables 
which are highly market-specific and thus can also be applied to investigate the relationship 
between trade segmentation and price leadership in other financial segments. The 
distinguishing features of the markets examined here are the close institutional linkage 
between the two trading venues and the policy relevance of a multi-platform environment in 
the context of euro-denominated government bond trading. 
In the light of the debate on whether and how to extend the MiFID regime to the 
Treasury bond market, our findings are of extreme importance for supervisory authorities. It 
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is well known that the features of the secondary market influence considerably government 
debt managing and the sale of government securities in primary markets. In this respect, a 
pre-requisite for efficient secondary markets is the abolition of unnecessary barriers to the 
establishment of a fully integrated multi-platform environment in order to allow competition 
across platforms to drive down the cost of capital. 
Our findings suggest, however, that policy interventions aimed at fostering competition 
across market venues by setting an “optimal” number of alternative trading platforms are 
likely to be ineffective (or even distorting) since the choice of where investors trade should be 
ultimately determined by individual preferences. On the one hand, the simulation results from 
fraction regressions suggest that even in the case of an extremely polarised environment there 
is a role in price formation for the satellite market. This means that establishing mandatory 
trading platforms is not a useful option for debt managers to enhance price discovery. On the 
other hand, the empirical evidence from the duplicated market setting characterising the MTS 
system suggests that a move toward the case of perfect market segmentation should not affect 
the dominance (in term of its contribution to price discovery) of the polar market, since 
investors’ habits make it difficult to migrate from a trading platform to another. 
Our results also have implications for how debt managers should ascertain the 
fulfilment of market-making obligations. Since informative prices are the key ingredient in 
ensuring the sale of government securities in the primary market at the best achievable price, 
the market activity of primary dealers should be evaluated (and to some extent rewarded) on 
the basis of the platform on which, on average, information is more quickly incorporated into 
prices. 
Admittedly, no attempt has been made in this paper to investigate how information 
asymmetries among market participants affect the price formation mechanism in the European 
market of Treasury securities or to what extent the ongoing financial turmoil has affected the 
 [23] 
process of price discovery in the MTS system. These issues are beyond the scope of the 
present study, and will be the subject of future research. 
 
Acknowledgments 
We are very grateful to an anonymous referee as well as Mario Anolli, Leonardo 
Becchetti, Sergio Ginebri, Cherl-Hyun Kim, Claudio Impenna, Paolo Paesani, Gustavo Piga 
and Barbara Rindi for their useful comments and suggestions. 
 [24] 
References 
Baillie, R.T., Booth, G.G., Tse Y., Zabotina T., 2002. Price discovery and common factor 
models. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 309-321. 
Bastos, J.A., 2010. Forecasting bank loans loss-given-default. Journal of Banking and Finance 
34, 2510-2517. 
Beber, A., Brandt, M.W., Kavajecz, K.A., 2009. Flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity? 
Evidence from the euro-area bond market. Review of Financial Studies 22, 925-957.  
Blanco R., Brennan, S., Marsh, I., 2005. An empirical analysis of the dynamic relation 
between investment-grade bonds and credit default swaps. Journal of Finance 60, 2255-2281. 
Brandt, M.W., Kavajecz, K.A., Underwood, S.E., 2007. Price discovery in the treasury 
futures market. Journal of Futures Markets 27, 1021-1051. 
Bui, T.N.T, Sercu, P., 2009. Trading systems efficiency and noise: Price-discovery dynamics 
in the two-tier Brussels exchange. Mimeo, University of Leuven. 
BearingPoint, 2005. The electronic bond market 2005: An analysis of the electronic bond 
market in the eurozone. 
Caporale, G.M., Girardi, A., 2011. Price formation on the EuroMTS platform. Applied 
Economics Letters 18, 229-233. 
Caporale, G.M., Girardi, A., Paesani, P., 2012. Quoted spreads and trade imbalance dynamics 
in the European treasury bond market. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 52, 173-
182. 
Chakravarty, S., Gulen, H., Mayhew, S., 2004. Informed trading in stock and option markets. 
Journal of Finance 59, 1235-1258. 
Cheung, C., de Jong, F., Rindi, B., 2005. Trading European sovereign bonds: The 
microstructure of the MTS trading platforms. ECB Working Paper, 432. 
Chung, C., Campbell, B., Hendry, S., 2007. Price discovery in Canadian government bond 
 [25] 
futures and spot markets. Bank of Canada Working Paper, 4.  
Dufour, A., Skinner, F., 2004. MTS time series: Market and data description for the European 
bond and repo database. ISMA Centre Discussion Paper in Finance, 7. 
Dunne, P.G., Moore, M.J., Portes, R., 2007. Benchmark status in fixed-income asset markets. 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 34, 1615-1634. 
Eun, C.S., Sabherwal, S., 2003. Cross-border listings and price discovery: Evidence from 
U.S.-listed Canadian stocks. Journal of Finance 58, 549-576. 
Figuerola-Ferretti, I., Gonzalo, J., 2010. Modelling and measuring price discovery in 
commodity markets. Journal of Econometrics 158, 95-107.  
Galati, G., Tsatsaronis, K., 2003. The impact of the euro on Europe’s financial markets. 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 12, 165-221. 
Gonzalo, J., Granger, C.W.J., 1995. Estimation of common long-memory components in 
cointegrated systems. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13, 27-35.  
Gonzalo, J., Ng, S., 2001. A systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of 
permanent and transitory shocks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25, 1527-1546. 
Green, C.J., Joujon, E., 2000. Unified tests of causality and cost of carry: The pricing of the 
French stock index futures contract. International Journal of Finance and Economics 5, 121-
140. 
Harris, F., McInish, T., Shoesmith, G., Wood, R., 1995. Cointegration, error correction, and 
price discovery on informationally linked security markets. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 30, 563-579.  
Hasbrouck, J., 1995. One security, many markets: Determining the contributions to price 
discovery. Journal of Finance 50, 1175-1199.  
Hasbrouck, J., 2002. Stalking the “efficient price” in market microstructure specifications: An 
overview. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 329-339. 
 [26] 
Horvath, M.T.K., Watson, M.W., 1995. Testing for cointegration when some of the 
cointegrating vectors are prespecified. Econometric Theory 11, 984-1014. 
Huang, R.D., 2002. The quality of ECN and Nasdaq market maker quotes. Journal of Finance 
57, 1285-1319. 
Johansen, S., 1991. Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in Gaussian 
vector autoregressive models. Econometrica 59, 1551-1580.  
Kim, C.-H., 2010. Cross-border listing and price discovery: Canadian blue chips traded in 
TSX and NYSE. Mimeo, University of Washington.  
Menkveld, A.J., Cheung, Y.C., de Jong, F., 2004. Euro area sovereign yield dynamics: The 
role of order imbalance. ECB Working Paper, 385. 
Mizrach, B., 2008. Jump and cojump risk in subprime home equity derivatives. Rutgers 
University Working Paper, 2008-02.  
Papke, L.E., Wooldridge, J.M., 1996. Econometric methods for fractional response variables 
with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Journal of Applied Econometrics 11, 
619-632.  
Persaud, A.D., 2006. Improving efficiency in the European government bond market, 
Discussion Paper ICAP plc.  
Tse, Y., Xiang, J., Fung, J.K.W., 2006. Price discovery in the foreign exchange futures 
market. Journal of Futures Markets 26, 1131-1143. 
Upper, C., Werner, T., 2002. How resilient are financial markets to stress? Bund futures and 
bonds during the 1998 turbulence. BIS Papers 12, 110-123.  
Yan, B., Zivot, E., 2007. The dynamics of price discovery. Mimeo, University of Washington. 
 
 [27] 
Table 1 – Properties of price discovery measures 
Metrics Identification Boundedness Inference 
LS S   [0,1] 
+
 B 
IS R   [0,1] 
●
 B 
CS R   [0,1] 
◊
   A,B 
◊
 
YZ S (-∞,+∞) B 
          
S: structural identification structure 
R: reduced-form identification structure 
+
: always 
●
: when upper and lower bounds are averaged (Ballie et al., 2002) 
◊
: iff both feedback coefficients in model (3) are correctly signed 
B: bootstrap-based confidence intervals 
A: asymptotic intervals 
 
Note. LS, IS, CS and YZ stand for the price discovery measure based on loss share, information share, 
component share and Yan and Zivot (2007) methods, respectively. See conditions (5), (6), (15) and (16) of the 
main text. 
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Table 2 – ISIN codes 
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 AT0000383518 BE0000286923 ES0000012239 FI0001004822 FR0000187361 DE0001135176 GR0110014165 IE0006857530 IT0001448619 NL0000102101 PTOTECOE0011 
2 AT0000383864 BE0000291972 ES0000012387 FI0001005167 FR0000187635 DE0001135192 GR0114012371 IE0031256211 IT0003080402 NL0000102317 PTOTEGOE0009 
3 AT0000384227 BE0000296054 ES0000012411 FI0001005332 FR0000187874 DE0001135200 GR0114015408 IE0031256328 IT0003171946 NL0000102606 PTOTEJOE0006 
4 AT0000384821 BE0000297060 ES0000012445 FI0001005407 FR0000188328 DE0001135218 GR0124006405 IE0032584868 IT0003190912 NL0000102671 PTOTEKOE0003 
5 AT0000384938 BE0000298076 ES0000012452 FI0001005514 FR0000188690 DE0001135226 GR0124011454 . IT0003242747 NL0000102689 PTOTEWOE0009 
6 AT0000384953 BE0000300096 ES0000012783 FI0001005522 FR0000188989 DE0001135234 GR0124015497 . IT0003256820 NL0000102697 PTOTEXOE0016 
7 AT0000385067 BE0000301102 ES0000012791 . FR0000189151 DE0001135242 GR0124018525 . IT0003271019 . . 
8 AT0000385356 BE0000302118 ES0000012825 . FR0010011130 DE0001141380 GR0124021552 . IT0003357982 . . 
9 AT0000385745 BE0000303124 ES0000012866 . FR0103230423 DE0001141398 GR0124024580 . IT0003413892 . . 
10 AT0000385992 . ES0000012882 . FR0103840098 DE0001141406 GR0128002590 . IT0003472336 . . 
11 . . . . FR0104446556 DE0001141414 GR0133001140 . IT0003477111 . . 
12 . . . . FR0105427795 DE0001141422 GR0133002155 . IT0003493258 . . 
13 . . . . FR0105760112 DE0001141430 . . IT0003522254 . . 
14 . . . . FR0106589437 . . . IT0003532097 . . 
15 . . . . . . . . IT0003535157 . . 
16 . . . . . . . . IT0003611156 . . 
17 . . . . . . . . IT0003618383 . . 
 
Note. The bond markets are those of Austria (ATS), Belgium (BEL), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRF), Germany (GEM), Greece (GGB), Ireland (IRL), Italy (MTS), the 
Netherlands (NLD) and Portugal (PTE). 
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Table 3 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery: Absolute LS - LS (abs)  
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 
0.9803 
[0.7491 , 0.9851] 
0.9143 
[0.6698 , 0.9831] 
0.9690 
[0.7247 , 0.9849] 
0.9027 
[0.6080 , 0.9729] 
0.8791 
[0.6248 , 0.9853] 
0.6273 
[0.2515 , 0.9066] 
0.8801 
[0.5399 , 0.9615] 
0.4067 
[0.1336 , 0.7977] 
0.7985 
[0.5854 , 0.9690] 
0.9098 
[0.6393 , 0.9789] 
0.7765 
[0.5935 , 0.9455] 
2 
0.9176 
[0.5806 , 0.9903] 
0.6607 
[0.3393 , 0.8612] 
0.6473 
[0.3155 , 0.8390] 
0.8759 
[0.5918 , 0.9758] 
0.8885 
[0.6302 , 0.9713] 
0.8233 
[0.5390 , 0.9844] 
0.6430 
[0.2641 , 0.8977] 
0.6213 
[0.3768 , 0.8458] 
0.9086 
[0.7210 , 0.9840] 
0.7861 
[0.4849 , 0.9772] 
0.8448 
[0.6395 , 0.9821] 
3 
0.9500 
[0.7128 , 0.9911] 
0.8374 
[0.6383 , 0.9708] 
0.7410 
[0.3210 , 0.9639] 
0.8487 
[0.5161 , 0.9350] 
0.8524 
[0.6540 , 0.9819] 
0.8153 
[0.5436 , 0.9854] 
0.9590 
[0.7136 , 0.9760] 
0.3014 
[0.1509 , 0.6868] 
0.8754 
[0.6562 , 0.9592] 
0.8241 
[0.6168 , 0.9730] 
0.9667 
[0.7143 , 0.9876] 
4 
0.9102 
[0.6070 , 0.9898] 
0.8208 
[0.5996 , 0.9755] 
0.8866 
[0.4198 , 0.9570] 
0.8203 
[0.6170 , 0.9641] 
0.9568 
[0.6806 , 0.9904] 
0.8730 
[0.7060 , 0.9893] 
0.9707 
[0.7600 , 0.9796] 
0.6267 
[0.2390 , 0.8576] 
0.8822 
[0.6472 , 0.9724] 
0.8272 
[0.6173 , 0.9798] 
0.9748 
[0.7478 , 0.9912] 
5 
0.8843 
[0.6741 , 0.9896] 
0.7600 
[0.5409 , 0.9495] 
0.9129 
[0.6341 , 0.9858] 
0.8328 
[0.5137 , 0.9337] 
0.9313 
[0.6978 , 0.9864] 
0.9058 
[0.6816 , 0.9593] 
0.7278 
[0.4727 , 0.9469] 
. 
0.9639 
[0.7579 , 0.9810] 
0.8221 
[0.5841 , 0.9766] 
0.9800 
[0.7427 , 0.9900] 
6 
0.9774 
[0.7727 , 0.9837] 
0.9142 
[0.7101 , 0.9860] 
0.9645 
[0.7556 , 0.9849] 
0.5997 
[0.3942 , 0.8333] 
0.8221 
[0.5970 , 0.9823] 
0.6024 
[0.3378 , 0.8034] 
0.9503 
[0.7587 , 0.9810] 
. 
0.9250 
[0.7758 , 0.9717] 
0.7532 
[0.2993 , 0.9248] 
0.9537 
[0.7550 , 0.9730] 
7 
0.8831 
[0.6434 , 0.9848] 
0.7616 
[0.5648 , 0.9519] 
0.8853 
[0.6816 , 0.9696] 
. 
0.8682 
[0.5885 , 0.9580] 
0.9574 
[0.7475 , 0.9870] 
0.9288 
[0.5891 , 0.9771] 
. 
0.8171 
[0.6344 , 0.9485] 
. . 
8 
0.9379 
[0.6725 , 0.9898] 
0.8626 
[0.5625 , 0.9766] 
0.6787 
[0.2045 , 0.9099] 
. 
0.8147 
[0.5875 , 0.9618] 
0.7151 
[0.4228 , 0.9136] 
0.8613 
[0.6120 , 0.9659] 
. 
0.9731 
[0.6961 , 0.9797] 
. . 
9 
0.7998 
[0.5055 , 0.9470] 
0.9636 
[0.7629 , 0.9884] 
0.9201 
[0.6328 , 0.9868] 
. 
0.9620 
[0.6987 , 0.9788] 
0.9506 
[0.6688 , 0.9834] 
0.9820 
[0.7018 , 0.9882] 
. 
0.7819 
[0.5871 , 0.9406] 
. . 
10 
0.9265 
[0.6835 , 0.9904] 
. 
0.8516 
[0.6216 , 0.9681] 
. 
0.9095 
[0.7657 , 0.9630] 
0.7917 
[0.4958 , 0.9532] 
0.8163 
[0.5801 , 0.9550] 
. 
0.9098 
[0.6808 , 0.9680] 
. . 
11 . . . . 
0.9644 
[0.7295 , 0.9895] 
0.5265 
[0.2775 , 0.7560] 
0.9567 
[0.7442 , 0.9781] 
. 
0.7604 
[0.5448 , 0.9187] 
. . 
12 . . . . 
0.604 
[0.2611 , 0.8994] 
0.6521 
[0.3126 , 0.8538] 
0.4576 
[0.4218 , 0.7195] 
. 
0.9311 
[0.7707 , 0.9767] 
. . 
13 . . . . 
0.7350 
[0.4627 , 0.9425] 
0.7532 
[0.3269 , 0.9206] 
. . 
0.7824 
[0.6010 , 0.8906] 
. . 
14 . . . . 
0.9214 
[0.6406 , 0.9778] 
. . . 
0.9104 
[0.7271 , 0.9689] 
. . 
15 . . . . . . . . 
0.8942 
[0.7414 , 0.9602] 
. . 
16 . . . . . . . . 
0.9146 
[0.7509 , 0.9623] 
. . 
17 . . . . . . . . 
0.8163 
[0.5624 , 0.9550] 
. . 
 
Note. See Table 2. The price discovery estimates are obtained from conditions (14) and (16) of the main text, with the loss function (.) .  and a truncation lag *m  set equal to 100. 
95 percent confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications are in square brackets. Statistically significant shares larger than 0.5 are reported in bold.  
 [30] 
Table 4 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery: Square LS - LS (sq)  
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 0.9995 
[0.8978 , 0.9996] 
0.9928 
[0.8486 , 0.9996] 
0.9992 
[0.8836 , 0.9996] 
0.9898 
[0.6966 , 0.9987] 
0.9826 
[0.7519 , 0.9996] 
0.7391 
[0.1306 , 0.9925] 
0.9901 
[0.5564 , 0.9985] 
0.3044 
[0.0212 , 0.9674] 
0.9501 
[0.7257 , 0.9988] 
0.9903 
[0.7499 , 0.9992] 
0.9301 
[0.7082 , 0.9956] 
2 0.9922 
[0.6389 , 0.9998] 
0.8568 
[0.1923 , 0.9859] 
0.7776 
[0.1413 , 0.9646] 
0.9727 
[0.6207 , 0.9987] 
0.9857 
[0.7820 , 0.9969] 
0.9604 
[0.5746 , 0.9994] 
0.8224 
[0.1110 , 0.9821] 
0.7665 
[0.2619 , 0.9710] 
0.9922 
[0.8945 , 0.9996] 
0.9365 
[0.4431 , 0.9993] 
0.9724 
[0.7985 , 0.9996] 
3 0.9972 
[0.8595 , 0.9998] 
0.9727 
[0.8193 , 0.9989] 
0.8963 
[0.0962 , 0.9969] 
0.9629 
[0.5403 , 0.9950] 
0.9683 
[0.7657 , 0.9993] 
0.9556 
[0.6217 , 0.9996] 
0.9989 
[0.8626 , 0.9994] 
0.1784 
[0.0203 , 0.8859] 
0.9840 
[0.8598 , 0.9978] 
0.9501 
[0.6889 , 0.9982] 
0.9990 
[0.8794 , 0.9997] 
4 0.9912 
[0.7212 , 0.9997] 
0.9616 
[0.7622 , 0.9991] 
0.9602 
[0.2406 , 0.9956] 
0.9644 
[0.7801 , 0.9982] 
0.9981 
[0.8311 , 0.9997] 
0.9797 
[0.8524 , 0.9997] 
0.9990 
[0.8919 , 0.9995] 
0.8265 
[0.0538 , 0.9779] 
0.9880 
[0.8482 , 0.9991] 
0.9622 
[0.7482 , 0.9991] 
0.9993 
[0.9001 , 0.9998] 
5 0.9822 
[0.8046 , 0.9997] 
0.9199 
[0.6234 , 0.9964] 
0.9920 
[0.7799 , 0.9995] 
0.9660 
[0.6245 , 0.9973] 
0.9957 
[0.8773 , 0.9995] 
0.9858 
[0.7918 , 0.9980] 
0.8767 
[0.4139 , 0.9972] . 
0.9968 
[0.9325 , 0.9996] 
0.9583 
[0.6667 , 0.9991] 
0.9996 
[0.9132 , 0.9996] 
6 0.9998 
[0.9088 , 0.9999] 
0.9914 
[0.8537 , 0.9997] 
0.9988 
[0.8850 , 0.9996] 
0.7824 
[0.3810 , 0.9734] 
0.9581 
[0.6822 , 0.9993] 
0.7410 
[0.1761 , 0.9652] 
0.9975 
[0.8845 , 0.9995] . 
0.9866 
[0.9196 , 0.9989] 
0.9352 
[0.1028 , 0.9922] 
0.9976 
[0.9285 , 0.9992] 
7 0.9849 
[0.7818 , 0.9996] 
0.9338 
[0.6808 , 0.9975] 
0.9882 
[0.8290 , 0.9987] . 
0.9849 
[0.7241 , 0.9984] 
0.9982 
[0.8995 , 0.9997] 
0.9931 
[0.6255 , 0.9990] . 
0.9679 
[0.8316 , 0.9971] . . 
8 0.9958 
[0.8177 , 0.9998] 
0.9789 
[0.6149 , 0.9990] 
0.7917 
[0.0295 , 0.9860] . 
0.9588 
[0.7092 , 0.9979] 
0.9039 
[0.3494 , 0.9928] 
0.9824 
[0.7545 , 0.9990] . 
0.9994 
[0.8652 , 0.9994] . . 
9 0.9554 
[0.3832 , 0.9957] 
0.9986 
[0.9218 , 0.9998] 
0.9923 
[0.7666 , 0.9996] . 
0.9987 
[0.8596 , 0.9995] 
0.9973 
[0.7985 , 0.9995] 
0.9992 
[0.8578 , 0.9995] . 
0.9450 
[0.7181 , 0.9963] . . 
10 0.9941 
[0.8310 , 0.9998] . 
0.9816 
[0.7802 , 0.9993] . 
0.9896 
[0.9144 , 0.9980] 
0.9534 
[0.5694 , 0.9971] 
0.9702 
[0.7224 , 0.9979] . 
0.9934 
[0.8753 , 0.9988] . . 
11 
. . . . 
0.9987 
[0.8681 , 0.9998] 
0.5869 
[0.1088 , 0.9209] 
0.9971 
[0.8931 , 0.9995] . 
0.9527 
[0.7284 , 0.9932] . . 
12 
. . . . 
0.5940 
[0.0442 , 0.9890] 
0.8399 
[0.1391 , 0.9832] 
0.3777 
[0.3237 , 0.8433] . 
0.9940 
[0.9263 , 0.9995] . . 
13 
. . . . 
0.9078 
[0.4371 , 0.9958] 
0.9336 
[0.1299 , 0.9934] . . 
0.9516 
[0.8022 , 0.9882] . . 
14 
. . . . 
0.9944 
[0.7443 , 0.9993] . . . 
0.9937 
[0.9288 , 0.9990] . . 
15 
. . . . . . . . 
0.9868 
[0.9069 , 0.9986] . . 
16 
. . . . . . . . 
0.9910 
[0.9287 , 0.9986] . . 
17 
        
0.9724 
[0.7499 , 0.9982]   
 
Note. See Table 2. The price discovery estimates are obtained from conditions (14) and (16) of the main text, with the loss function 2(.) (.)  and a truncation lag *m  set equal to 
100. 95 percent confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications are in square brackets. Statistically significant shares larger than 0.5 are reported in bold. 
 [31] 
Table 5 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery: IS - upper bounds 
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 0.9847 
[0.8701 , 0.9999] 
0.9903 
[0.8919 , 0.9999] 
0.9596 
[0.8264 , 0.9995] 
0.9174 
[0.7636 , 0.9891] 
0.9808 
[0.8119 , 0.9999] 
0.8434 
[0.6993 , 0.952] 
0.9609 
[0.8536 , 0.999] 
0.5830 
[0.2888 , 0.8839] 
0.9944 
[0.9400 , 0.9999] 
0.9375 
[0.7986 , 0.9966] 
0.9385 
[0.8221 , 0.9918] 
2 0.9874 
[0.6578 , 0.9999] 
0.8557 
[0.6321 , 0.9727] 
0.7390 
[0.5154 , 0.9020] 
0.9856 
[0.9052 , 0.9999] 
0.9820 
[0.8019 , 0.9999] 
0.9741 
[0.8021 , 0.9999] 
0.8690 
[0.7367 , 0.9669] 
0.8287 
[0.6137 , 0.9625] 
0.9990 
[0.9681 , 0.9999] 
0.9020 
[0.5175 , 0.9995] 
0.9982 
[0.9465 , 0.9999] 
3 0.9994 
[0.9096 , 0.9999] 
0.9433 
[0.7956 , 0.9976] 
0.8693 
[0.6409 , 0.9855] 
0.9466 
[0.8309 , 0.9981] 
0.9625 
[0.8091 , 0.9997] 
0.9383 
[0.6940 , 0.9993] 
0.9756 
[0.8916 , 0.9998] 
0.5225 
[0.3315 , 0.7446] 
0.9929 
[0.9419 , 0.9999] 
0.9572 
[0.8116 , 0.9995] 
0.9844 
[0.8784 , 0.9999] 
4 0.9690 
[0.7648 , 0.9999] 
0.9831 
[0.8662 , 0.9999] 
0.9358 
[0.7192 , 0.9997] 
0.9505 
[0.8513 , 0.9934] 
0.9884 
[0.8242 , 0.9999] 
0.9644 
[0.7894 , 0.9999] 
0.9842 
[0.9199 , 0.9999] 
0.6548 
[0.3813 , 0.8838] 
0.9948 
[0.9466 , 0.9999] 
0.9522 
[0.7664 , 0.9993] 
0.9997 
[0.9226 , 0.9999] 
5 0.9788 
[0.8392 , 0.9999] 
0.9653 
[0.8219 , 0.9996] 
0.9735 
[0.8008 , 0.9999] 
0.8980 
[0.7998 , 0.9645] 
0.9684 
[0.8186 , 0.9996] 
0.9735 
[0.8974 , 0.9998] 
0.9616 
[0.8657 , 0.9986] 
. 0.9972 
[0.9563 , 0.9999] 
0.9136 
[0.7416 , 0.9883] 
0.9971 
[0.9514 , 0.9999] 
6 0.9836 
[0.8998 , 0.9999] 
0.9950 
[0.9521 , 0.9999] 
0.9999 
[0.9565 , 0.9999] 
0.8839 
[0.7577 , 0.9686] 
0.9571 
[0.8142 , 0.9996] 
0.7050 
[0.4312 , 0.9012] 
0.9996 
[0.9667 , 0.9999] 
. 0.9972 
[0.9497 , 0.9999] 
0.8623 
[0.6905 , 0.9746] 
0.9783 
[0.8972 , 0.9998] 
7 0.9549 
[0.7736 , 0.9996] 
0.9320 
[0.8125 , 0.9902] 
0.9010 
[0.7677 , 0.9755] 
. 0.9339 
[0.8387 , 0.9869] 
0.9972 
[0.8960 , 0.9999] 
0.9724 
[0.8610 , 0.9999] 
. 0.9920 
[0.9382 , 0.9999] 
. . 
8 0.9740 
[0.7821 , 0.9999] 
0.9542 
[0.8353 , 0.9988] 
0.8246 
[0.6811 , 0.9203] 
. 0.9508 
[0.8130 , 0.9982] 
0.8551 
[0.6676 , 0.966] 
0.9667 
[0.8978 , 0.9979] 
. 0.9996 
[0.9606 , 0.9999] 
. . 
9 0.8313 
[0.6124 , 0.9564] 
0.9986 
[0.9509 , 0.9999] 
0.9720 
[0.8085 , 0.9999] 
. 0.9884 
[0.9032 , 0.9999] 
0.9923 
[0.9224 , 0.9999] 
0.9938 
[0.9425 , 0.9999] 
. 0.9868 
[0.9375 , 0.9999] 
. . 
10 0.9900 
[0.8823 , 0.9999] 
. 0.9597 
[0.8702 , 0.9975] 
. 0.9952 
[0.9235 , 0.9999] 
0.9384 
[0.7678 , 0.9979] 
0.9681 
[0.9035 , 0.9984] 
. 0.9917 
[0.9442 , 0.9999] 
. . 
11 . . . . 0.9855 
[0.8724 , 0.9999] 
0.7584 
[0.4798 , 0.9422] 
0.9751 
[0.8983 , 0.9998] 
. 0.9962 
[0.9601 , 0.9999] 
. . 
12 . . . . 0.7447 
[0.5645 , 0.8913] 
0.8398 
[0.6796 , 0.9393] 
0.9852 
[0.8896 , 0.9999] 
. 0.9969 
[0.9639 , 0.9999] 
. . 
13 . . . . 0.8599 
[0.6633 , 0.9679] 
0.8078 
[0.6327 , 0.9295] 
. . 0.9991 
[0.9757 , 0.9999] 
. . 
14 . . . . 0.9798 
[0.8546 , 0.9999] 
. . . 0.9999 
[0.9750 , 0.9999] 
. . 
15 . . . . . . . . 0.9997 
[0.9741 , 0.9999] 
. . 
16 . . . . . . . . 0.9954 
[0.9558 , 0.9999] 
. . 
17 . . . . . . . . 0.9922 
[0.9530 , 0.9999] 
. . 
 
Note. See Table 2. The price discovery estimates are obtained from condition (5) of the main text, the MTS prices being the first variable in the Choleski factorisation of the e  
matrix. 95 percent confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications are in square brackets. Statistically significant shares larger than 0.5 are reported in bold. 
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Table 6 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery: IS - lower bounds 
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 0.8364 
[0.6228 , 0.9538] 
0.6652 
[0.4320 , 0.8527] 
0.7069 
[0.4859 , 0.8648] 
0.5528 
[0.3396 , 0.7306] 
0.8419 
[0.5667 , 0.977] 
0.2797 
[0.1401 , 0.4578] 
0.3445 
[0.1765 , 0.5177] 
0.3099 
[0.0812 , 0.6567] 
0.7922 
[0.6374 , 0.8998] 
0.5701 
[0.3594 , 0.7521] 
0.7661 
[0.5952 , 0.8856] 
2 0.9464 
[0.5393 , 0.9998] 
0.4910 
[0.2420 , 0.7082] 
0.4594 
[0.2391 , 0.6735] 
0.5557 
[0.3650 , 0.7187] 
0.8668 
[0.5849 , 0.9894] 
0.6853 
[0.3913 , 0.8741] 
0.2178 
[0.0972 , 0.3886] 
0.5366 
[0.2985 , 0.7557] 
0.7655 
[0.6327 , 0.8668] 
0.8727 
[0.4710 , 0.9986] 
0.8882 
[0.7477 , 0.9680] 
3 0.9536 
[0.7760 , 0.9995] 
0.7520 
[0.5355 , 0.8955] 
0.4303 
[0.1836 , 0.6753] 
0.4097 
[0.2332 , 0.6030] 
0.8946 
[0.6925 , 0.9868] 
0.8216 
[0.5142 , 0.9634] 
0.5655 
[0.3880 , 0.7236] 
0.2858 
[0.1306 , 0.5118] 
0.7134 
[0.5612 , 0.8295] 
0.8432 
[0.6360 , 0.9616] 
0.8140 
[0.6076 , 0.9466] 
4 0.8299 
[0.5310 , 0.9665] 
0.8242 
[0.6078 , 0.9483] 
0.5245 
[0.2362 , 0.7794] 
0.6751 
[0.5075 , 0.8000] 
0.8548 
[0.5696 , 0.9791] 
0.8999 
[0.7816 , 0.9999] 
0.6770 
[0.5199 , 0.7958] 
0.3795 
[0.1421 , 0.6557] 
0.6286 
[0.4692 , 0.7481] 
0.8012 
[0.5394 , 0.9495] 
0.9328 
[0.7522 , 0.9975] 
5 0.9079 
[0.7043 , 0.9915] 
0.7375 
[0.4991 , 0.8907] 
0.8111 
[0.5364 , 0.9593] 
0.3738 
[0.2459 , 0.5079] 
0.8961 
[0.6909 , 0.9932] 
0.3381 
[0.1955 , 0.5014] 
0.4999 
[0.3257 , 0.6590] 
. 0.6853 
[0.5322 , 0.8034] 
0.5520 
[0.3212 , 0.7327] 
0.6375 
[0.4711 , 0.7757] 
6 0.6471 
[0.4555 , 0.7974] 
0.6877 
[0.5425 , 0.8253] 
0.7326 
[0.5493 , 0.8648] 
0.4112 
[0.2550 , 0.5801] 
0.7174 
[0.4879 , 0.9056] 
0.5058 
[0.2391 , 0.7486] 
0.7087 
[0.5556 , 0.8228] 
. 0.6441 
[0.4730 , 0.7747] 
0.3899 
[0.2007 , 0.6084] 
0.7025 
[0.5298 , 0.8393] 
7 0.7512 
[0.4813 , 0.9117] 
0.5767 
[0.3938 , 0.7325] 
0.6187 
[0.4372 , 0.7678] 
. 0.4588 
[0.3103 , 0.6033] 
0.8385 
[0.5955 , 0.957] 
0.4875 
[0.2801 , 0.6779] 
. 0.6747 
[0.5169 , 0.7924] 
. . 
8 0.9139 
[0.6609 , 0.9951] 
0.4793 
[0.2844 , 0.6605] 
0.2635 
[0.1315 , 0.4003] 
. .0.6560 
[0.4352 , 0.8154] 
0.4721 
[0.2586 , 0.6734] 
0.4607 
[0.3228 , 0.5977] 
. 0.6490 
[0.4797 , 0.7994] 
. . 
9 0.6671 
[0.4219 , 0.8467] 
0.8344 
[0.6563 , 0.945] 
0.7492 
[0.4760 , 0.913] 
. 0.6554 
[0.4495 , 0.8078] 
0.5814 
[0.3884 , 0.753] 
0.4585 
[0.3008 , 0.6012] 
. 0.6571 
[0.5224 , 0.7752] 
. . 
10 0.8901 
[0.6924 , 0.9834] 
. 0.5530 
[0.3878 , 0.7005] 
. 0.7293 
[0.5273 , 0.8846] 
0.6452 
[0.3962 , 0.8413] 
0.4599 
[0.3274 , 0.6000] 
. 0.5028 
[0.3576 , 0.6291] 
. . 
11 . . . . 0.8347 
[0.6209 , 0.9537] 
0.4335 
[0.1715 , 0.6987] 
0.5904 
[0.4249 , 0.7366] 
. 0.4204 
[0.2874 , 0.5558] 
. . 
12 . . . . 0.4287 
[0.2493 , 0.6209] 
0.4535 
[0.2722 , 0.6151] 
0.3702 
[0.1780 , 0.5848] 
. 0.6513 
[0.5196 , 0.7731] 
. . 
13 . . . . 0.5299 
[0.3003 , 0.7250] 
0.4405 
[0.2542 , 0.6242] 
. . 0.6238 
[0.4860 , 0.7398] 
. . 
14 . . . . 0.6711 
[0.4261 , 0.8452] 
. . . 0.7277 
[0.5792 , 0.8339] 
. . 
15 . . . . . . . . 0.5175 
[0.3767 , 0.6423] 
. . 
16 . . . . . . . . 0.6493 
[0.5006 , 0.7789] 
. . 
17 . . . . . . . . 0.4390 
[0.3132 , 0.5665] 
. . 
 
Note. See Table 2. The price discovery estimates are obtained from condition (5) of the main text, with MTS prices being the last variable in the Choleski factorisation of the e  
matrix. 95 percent confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications are in square brackets. Statistically significant shares larger than 0.5 are reported in bold. 
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Table 7 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery: IS - average of upper and lower bounds 
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 0.9105 
[0.7464 , 0.9737] 
0.8278 
[0.6619 , 0.9186] 
0.8333 
[0.6561 , 0.9324] 
0.7351 
[0.5516 , 0.8598] 
0.9114 
[0.6893 , 0.9800] 
0.5616 
[0.4197 , 0.7049] 
0.6527 
[0.5151 , 0.7586] 
0.4465 
[0.1850 , 0.7703] 
0.8933 
[0.7887 , 0.947] 
0.7538 
[0.5790 , 0.8743] 
0.8523 
[0.7086 , 0.9387] 
2 0.9669 
[0.5986 , 0.9963] 
0.6734 
[0.4370 , 0.8405] 
0.5992 
[0.3772 , 0.7877] 
0.7707 
[0.6351 , 0.8581] 
0.9244 
[0.6934 , 0.9855] 
0.8297 
[0.5967 , 0.9345] 
0.5434 
[0.4169 , 0.6778] 
0.6826 
[0.4561 , 0.8591] 
0.8823 
[0.8008 , 0.9284] 
0.8874 
[0.4943 , 0.9984] 
0.9432 
[0.8485 , 0.9767] 
3 0.9765 
[0.8444 , 0.9906] 
0.8476 
[0.6656 , 0.9466] 
0.6498 
[0.4122 , 0.8304] 
0.6781 
[0.5321 , 0.8007] 
0.9285 
[0.7508 , 0.9929] 
0.8799 
[0.6041 , 0.9815] 
0.7706 
[0.6398 , 0.8618] 
0.4042 
[0.2310 , 0.6282] 
0.8532 
[0.7515 , 0.9133] 
0.9002 
[0.7238 , 0.9808] 
0.8992 
[0.7430 , 0.9691] 
4 0.8994 
[0.6479 , 0.9812] 
0.9037 
[0.7370 , 0.9715] 
0.7302 
[0.4777 , 0.8896] 
0.8128 
[0.6794 , 0.8967] 
0.9216 
[0.6969 , 0.9794] 
0.9321 
[0.8143 , 0.9917] 
0.8306 
[0.7199 , 0.8979] 
0.5172 
[0.2617 , 0.7697] 
0.8117 
[0.7079 , 0.8724] 
0.8767 
[0.6529 , 0.9746] 
0.9662 
[0.8386 , 0.9851] 
5 0.9434 
[0.7718 , 0.9923] 
0.8514 
[0.6605 , 0.9453] 
0.8923 
[0.6686 , 0.9748] 
0.6359 
[0.5228 , 0.7362] 
0.9322 
[0.7547 , 0.9936] 
0.6558 
[0.5465 , 0.7507] 
0.7307 
[0.5957 , 0.8289] 
. 0.8412 
[0.7443 , 0.8983] 
0.7328 
[0.5314 , 0.8605] 
0.8173 
[0.7113 , 0.8830] 
6 0.8154 
[0.6777 , 0.8978] 
0.8413 
[0.7473 , 0.9085] 
0.8662 
[0.7583 , 0.9168] 
0.6475 
[0.5064 , 0.7744] 
0.8373 
[0.6511 , 0.9520] 
0.6054 
[0.3351 , 0.8249] 
0.8541 
[0.7620 , 0.9047] 
. 0.8207 
[0.7114 , 0.8832] 
0.6261 
[0.4456 , 0.7915] 
0.8404 
[0.7135 , 0.9195] 
7 0.8531 
[0.6275 , 0.9558] 
0.7543 
[0.6031 , 0.8614] 
0.7599 
[0.6024 , 0.8716] 
. 0.6964 
[0.5745 , 0.7951] 
0.9179 
[0.7457 , 0.9665] 
0.7299 
[0.5705 , 0.8386] 
. 0.8333 
[0.7276 , 0.8952] 
. . 
8 0.9440 
[0.7215 , 0.9948] 
0.7167 
[0.5599 , 0.8297] 
0.5440 
[0.4063 , 0.6603] 
. 0.8034 
[0.6241 , 0.9069] 
0.6636 
[0.4631 , 0.8197] 
0.7137 
[0.6103 , 0.7978] 
. 0.8243 
[0.7215 , 0.8887] 
. . 
9 0.7492 
[0.5171 , 0.9015] 
0.9165 
[0.8139 , 0.9482] 
0.8606 
[0.6423 , 0.9549] 
. 0.8219 
[0.6763 , 0.9017] 
0.7868 
[0.6554 , 0.872] 
0.7261 
[0.6217 , 0.7985] 
. 0.8219 
[0.7300 , 0.8874] 
. . 
10 0.9401 
[0.7874 , 0.9851] 
. 0.7563 
[0.6299 , 0.8490] 
. 0.8622 
[0.7254 , 0.9337] 
0.7918 
[0.5820 , 0.9204] 
0.7140 
[0.6155 , 0.7992] 
. 0.7473 
[0.6509 , 0.8139] 
. . 
11 . . . . 0.9101 
[0.7467 , 0.9735] 
0.5960 
[0.3257 , 0.8204] 
0.7828 
[0.6616 , 0.8683] 
. 0.7083 
[0.6238 , 0.7751] 
. . 
12 . . . . 0.5867 
[0.4069 , 0.7561] 
0.6467 
[0.4759 , 0.7772] 
0.6777 
[0.5843 , 0.7372] 
. 0.8241 
[0.7568 , 0.8685] 
. . 
13 . . . . 0.6949 
[0.4818 , 0.8465] 
0.6242 
[0.4434 , 0.7769] 
. . 0.8115 
[0.7371 , 0.8580] 
. . 
14 . . . . 0.8255 
[0.6403 , 0.9205] 
. . . 0.8638 
[0.7788 , 0.9074] 
. . 
15 . . . . . . . . 0.7586 
[0.6757 , 0.8152] 
. . 
16 . . . . . . . . 0.8224 
[0.7468 , 0.8673] 
. . 
17 . . . . . . . . 0.7156 
[0.6331 , 0.7824] 
. . 
 
Note. See Table 2. The price discovery estimates are obtained from condition (5) of the main text and by computing the average value of upper and lower bounds. 95 percent 
confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications are in square brackets. Statistically significant shares larger than 0.5 are reported in bold. 
 [34] 
Table 8 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery: CS 
 ATS BEL ESP FIN FRF GEM GGB IRL MTS NLD PTM 
1 0.8875 
[0.7002 , 1.0784] 
0.8936 
[0.6693 , 1.1533] 
0.7922 
[0.6038 , 0.9921] 
0.7035 
[0.5237 , 0.8824] 
0.8667 
[0.6300 , 1.1378] 
0.5704 
[0.4040 , 0.7541] 
0.7384 
[0.5107 , 0.9673] 
0.4540 
[0.2457 , 0.6964] 
0.9098 
[0.7335 , 1.1058] 
0.7370 
[0.5535 , 0.9321] 
0.7353 
[0.5900 , 0.8908] 
2 0.9118 
[0.5993 , 1.2405] 
0.6372 
[0.4357 , 0.8291] 
0.5481 
[0.3910 , 0.7055] 
0.8445 
[0.6318 , 1.0725] 
0.8884 
[0.6637 , 1.1341] 
0.8352 
[0.5807 , 1.0838] 
0.5501 
[0.3655 , 0.7648] 
0.6148 
[0.4421 , 0.8019] 
0.9614 
[0.8018 , 1.1365] 
0.7716 
[0.5279 , 1.0746] 
0.9517 
[0.7705 , 1.1599] 
3 0.9773 
[0.7581 , 1.2167] 
0.7585 
[0.5826 , 0.9441] 
0.6519 
[0.4246 , 0.8756] 
0.7267 
[0.5300 , 0.9508] 
0.8339 
[0.6620 , 1.0203] 
0.7574 
[0.5259 , 0.9911] 
0.8239 
[0.6477 , 1.0113] 
0.4115 
[0.2854 , 0.5613] 
0.8932 
[0.7214 , 1.0782] 
0.8055 
[0.6317 , 1.0016] 
0.8684 
[0.6712 , 1.109] 
4 0.8336 
[0.5926 , 1.0721] 
0.8621 
[0.6562 , 1.0911] 
0.7480 
[0.4878 , 1.0176] 
0.7430 
[0.5912 , 0.8958] 
0.8990 
[0.6515 , 1.1543] 
1.1877 
[0.7792 , 1.6477] 
0.8567 
[0.6993 , 1.0120] 
0.4840 
[0.3000 , 0.6800] 
0.9012 
[0.7116 , 1.0862] 
0.8096 
[0.6122 , 1.0149] 
0.9817 
[0.7656 , 1.2300] 
5 0.8645 
[0.6710 , 1.0793] 
0.8031 
[0.5968 , 1.0167] 
0.8338 
[0.5980 , 1.1033] 
0.6293 
[0.4955 , 0.7703] 
0.8290 
[0.6398 , 1.0795] 
0.7704 
[0.5647 , 1.0041] 
0.7616 
[0.5798 , 0.9531] 
. 0.9291 
[0.7458 , 1.1238] 
0.6923 
[0.4981 , 0.8758] 
0.9269 
[0.7279 , 1.1494] 
6 0.8589 
[0.6735 , 1.0497] 
0.9136 
[0.7524 , 1.1245] 
1.0129 
[0.7979 , 1.2452] 
0.6116 
[0.4619 , 0.7826] 
0.7956 
[0.6067 , 1.0458] 
0.5357 
[0.3636 , 0.7081] 
0.9763 
[0.7994 , 1.1551] 
. 0.9337 
[0.7400 , 1.1265] 
0.6358 
[0.4552 , 0.8356] 
0.8374 
[0.6725 , 1.0205] 
7 0.7965 
[0.5829 , 1.0072] 
0.7125 
[0.5522 , 0.8805] 
0.6950 
[0.5556 , 0.8360] 
. 0.7156 
[0.5698 , 0.8663] 
0.9460 
[0.7065 , 1.1819] 
0.8058 
[0.5836 , 1.0351] 
. 0.8879 
[0.7140 , 1.0612] 
. . 
8 0.8499 
[0.6245 , 1.0784] 
0.7571 
[0.5588 , 0.9612] 
0.5534 
[0.3937 , 0.6938] 
. 0.7815 
[0.5990 , 0.9558] 
0.6193 
[0.4429 , 0.8004] 
0.7657 
[0.6098 , 0.9368] 
. 0.9711 
[0.7605 , 1.2323] 
. . 
9 0.6613 
[0.5059 , 0.8121] 
1.0484 
[0.8118 , 1.3338] 
0.8294 
[0.5970 , 1.0678] 
. 0.8796 
[0.6765 , 1.0814] 
0.8937 
[0.6844 , 1.1280] 
0.8863 
[0.6748 , 1.1010] 
. 0.8539 
[0.7058 , 1.0228] 
. . 
10 0.8947 
[0.6861 , 1.1378] 
. 0.7620 
[0.5992 , 0.9366] 
. 0.9285 
[0.7347 , 1.1519] 
0.7538 
[0.5527 , 0.9747] 
0.7708 
[0.6201 , 0.9464] 
. 0.8672 
[0.6799 , 1.0582] 
. . 
11 . . . . 0.8805 
[0.6817 , 1.0934] 
0.5310 
[0.3267 , 0.7461] 
0.8237 
[0.6621 , 0.9966] 
. 0.9037 
[0.7045 , 1.1267] 
. . 
12 . . . . 0.5941 
[0.4608 , 0.7297] 
0.6073 
[0.4586 , 0.7452] 
1.2477 
[0.8154 , 1.7567] 
. 1.0875 
[0.8878 , 1.3363] 
. . 
13 . . . . 0.6420 
[0.4655 , 0.8142] 
0.5815 
[0.4329 , 0.7320] 
. . 1.0449 
[0.8493 , 1.2555] 
. . 
14 . . . . 0.8588 
[0.6434 , 1.0705] 
. . . 1.0137 
[0.8128 , 1.2209] 
. . 
15 . . . . . . . . 0.9721 
[0.7706 , 1.1839] 
. . 
16 . . . . . . . . 1.1013 
[0.8859 , 1.3534] 
. . 
17 . . . . . . . . 0.8606 
[0.6794 , 1.0684] 
. . 
 
Note. See Table 2. The price discovery estimates are obtained from condition (6) of the main text. 95 percent confidence bounds obtained from 1000 bootstrap replications are in 
square brackets. Statistically significant shares larger than 0.5 are reported in bold. 
 [35] 
Table 9 – Domestic MTS markets’ contribution to price discovery:  
comparison between different measures 
 
 LS (abs) LS (sq) IS CS 
 Summary statistics 
median 0.8754 0.9822 0.8173 0.8294 
mean 0.8360 0.9323 0.7851 0.8006 
s.e. mean 0.0126 0.0131 0.0116 0.0134 
 Correlations 
LS (abs) 1 0.90 0.74 0.73 
LS (sq) . 1 0.67 0.59 
IS . . 1 0.81 
CS . . . 1 
 
Note. LS (abs), LS (sq) are obtained from conditions (14) and (16) of the main text, with a truncation lag *m  set equal 
to 100 and the loss function (.) .  and 2(.) (.) , respectively. IS and CS are computed according to conditions (5) 
and (6) of the main text, respectively. Average bounds for IS are used. Values for CS larger than 1 are replaced with 
unity. 
 
 [36] 
Table 10 – Observable market characteristics: summary statistics 
 
 trax  volx  sprx  
mean 0.7428 -0.0017 -0.0053 
min 0.4647 -0.0914 -0.0722 
max 0.9229 0.0315 0.2085 
I quartile 0.6803 -0.0059 -0.0198 
median 0.7368 0.0003 -0.0032 
III quartile 0.8244 0.0070 0.0046 
 
Note. 
trax  is defined as the ratio of the nominal trading volumes on the domestic MTS market to the aggregate nominal 
trades on both domestic MTS and EuroMTS markets (over the sample period); 
volx  is the difference (domestic MTS 
minus EuroMTS) between the absolute price changes (from equally-weighted daily averages over the sample period); 
sprx  is obtained as the difference (domestic MTS minus EuroMTS) between the best bid/ask spreads throughout the day 
(from equally-weighted daily averages over the sample period). 
 [37] 
Table 11 – Fraction regression results 
 A. - LS (abs) B. - LS (sq) 
 logit probit ols logit probit ols 
Trade share: trax  
3.7321 2.0243 0.5256 10.030 4.7265 0.6207 
(0.8612) (0.4883) (0.1391) (1.7528) (0.9319) (0.1822) 
Relative volatility: volx  
-16.150 -8.1545 -1.8083 -30.199 -14.513 -1.4153 
(5.8029) (-3.0296) (-0.6345) (16.266) (7.6225) (-0.7073) 
Relative spread: sprx  
-3.6872 -2.0195 -0.4344 -6.2197 -3.1808 -0.2476 
(2.8652) (-1.4654) (-0.3587) (5.1111) (2.2603) (-0.2667) 
Deviance explained  0.28 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.46 0.27 
of which due to: 
trax  0.20 0.20 0.19 0.37 0.39 0.23 
volx  0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 
sprx  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
Note. See Table 10. In each panel, the conditional mean of the loss share is computed as ( | ) ( )E LS x G x  , where (.)G  
can be the logistic function (column logit), the standard cumulative normal distribution (column probit) or the identity 
function (column ols). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficients at the 95 
(90) percent level are in bold (italics). 
 [38] 
Figure 1– Regression functions: dynamic price discovery measures 
A. LS (abs) B. LS (sq) 
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Note. LS (abs), LS (sq) are obtained from conditions (14) and (16) of the main text, with a truncation lag *m  set equal 
to 100 and the loss function (.) .  and 2(.) (.) , respectively. In each panel, the upper graph shows the partial 
effects of changes in the trade share, whilst the lower graph is based on the logit function, where the dotted bold line 
represents the partial effects, the dashed lines the 95 percent confidence intervals and the thin solid line the main 
diagonal.  
 
 [39] 
Figure 2 – Regression functions: traditional price discovery measures 
A. IS B. CS 
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Note. IS and CS are computed according to conditions (5) and (6) of the main text, respectively. Average bounds for IS 
are used. In each panel, the upper graph shows the partial effects of changes in the trade share, whilst the lower graph is 
based on the logit function, where the dotted bold line represents the partial effects, the dashed lines the 95 percent 
confidence intervals and the thin solid line the main diagonal. 
 
